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Political Islam in Somalia 2009
Abstract:
The presented paper is divided into two parts. The first part tries to elucidate the origin of 
political Islam and its expansion in the Muslim World. The second part discusses the devel-
opment of political Islam in contemporary Somalia.
The idea of Political Islam stems from the Koran, the Sunna, the Muslim history and some-
times from the elements of political movements outside Islam. The history of Political 
Islam is closely attached to the origin of Islam in which the Prophet Mohammad was the 
first political leader of the Muslim state; he was followed by his successors known as Cal-
iphs (Imamate for Shi'ites). The principle of Political Islam is that state must be based on 
the Islam law or Shari'a; the duty of the rulers is to seek Shura, or consultation from their 
subjects and to recognize the importance of rebuking unjust rulers but not encouraging 
rebellion against them (Mortimer E., 1982:37).
Political movement in the Muslim World is labeled as “Islamic fundamental-
ism” in the West, but I prefer to use the phrase used in the Muslim World: “Political Islam.” 
Professor Samir Amin defines political Islam as “political organization whose aim is the 
conquest of state power, nothing more, nothing less. Wrapping such organizations in the 
flag of Islam is simple, straightforward opportunism.” (Samir A., 2001:3–6)
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 Modern concept of Political Islam originates in India, where it was invented 
and used by the Orientalists serving British colonialism. The phrase itself is taken over 
from Syed Abdul A'ala Mawdudi (1903–1979), a major 20th century Islamist thinker 
and the founder of Jamaat-e-Islam – the Islamic revivalist party in Pakistan (Zebiri 
K., 1998:167–8).
The Pakistani political Islamists struggled for the Idea of Muslim believers that 
they may live only under the rule of an Islamic state; this struggle resulted in the division 
of India into the main land India and Pakistan which took place in 1947. The partition of 
Bangladesh (Eastern Pakistan) from Western Pakistan showed that national identity 
which caused this separation of the two regions in 1971 is stronger than religious iden-
tity. Samir Amin interprets Political Islam as political organization that is not interested 
in the religion which it invokes, and that does not propose any theological or social crit-
ics. It is hostile (adversarial) to the liberation theology, and advocates submission – not 
emancipation (Samir A., 2002:3). Political Islam demands a complete cultural return to 
the public and private rules which were practiced two hundred years ago in Ottoman Em-
pire, in Iran and in Central Asia by the then existing powers. Political Islam believes, or 
pretends to believe, that these rules are those of the “real Islam”, of the Islam existing at 
the time of the prophet. This is true, Islam permits this interpretation as legitimating the 
exercise of the power, as it has been used from Islam's origin up to modern time (Samir A., 
2002:4). The demands of Political Islam to go back to the past are not exceptional: in order 
to sustain the structures of political and social powers in the pre-modern Europe, Chris-
tianity has been doing the same. Contemporary Islam is an ideology based on the past, 
an ideology which proposes a pure and simple return to the past, and, more precisely, to 
the period immediately preceding the submission of the Muslim world to the expansion 
of capitalism and Western domination. The Political Islam does not offer a precise pro-
gram of what it would do when it takes over the power. Its answer to concrete questions 
of social and economic life is just an empty slogan: Islam is the solution. 
Development	of	the	Political	Islam	in	the	20th	century
One of the first Political Islamic movements is Salafism which originated in Saudi Arabia; 
it is based on the ideas of the radical theologist Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Mam-
dani M., 2005:1). 
Muhammad ibn ‚Abd al-Wahhab an-Najdi (1703–1792) was an Islamic scholar 
born in Najd, in the present-day Saudi Arabia. Confessionists of this form of Islam do not 
call themselves Wahhabists, but Muwahhidun (“Unitarians” or unifiers of Islamic prac-
tices). They use Salafi Dawa or Ahlul Sunna Wal jama'a. The teaching of the reformer 
Abd-Al-Wahhab is more often referred to by its adherents as Salafi, that is “following 
the forefathers of Islam”. 
In the opening decade of the nineteenth century, the Wahhabists and the 
House of Saudi dynasty formed an alliance commencing a state building project that 
was completed a century later. The Saudi House and the Wahhabists agreed to glorify 
the Saudi tribal raids on the neighbouring oases by treating them as jihads, in return for 
King Muhammad bin Saudi's promise to make Wahhabism the state ideology. The state 
building and expansion of Wahhabism collapsed during the occupation of the kingdom 
by the Ottoman Empire in 1818. The Saudi kingdom was restored by means of a series 
of Wahhabi-anointed jihads in the 1910's and 1920's; on the 21st September 1932, the 
whole finally unified territory was declared an independent kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(Ghassan S., 2000:763–65). The religious militia of King Saudi was given full support 
from the Wahhabists to unify the kingdom with air support of British who were occupy-
ing the Arabian Peninsula at that time. After World War II, the Americans replaced the 
British as the kingdom's main patron. When the Soviet Union intervened to Afghanistan 
in 1979, the then USA president Ronald Reagan used the Saudis as foils against them 
and Wahhabism was given the status of a liberation theology that would free the re-
gion of Communism (Mamdani M., 2005:2). The jihadist Islam was an ideology of mar-
ginal political significance in the late seventies, but in eighties the Reagan administra-
tion declared the Soviet Union to be an “evil empire” and set aside the common secular 
model of national liberation in favour of the international Islamic Jihad. Thanks to this 
cooperation the Afghan rebels could use the charities to recruit tens of thousands of 
volunteers and to create militarized madrassas (Islamic schools) that turned these vol-
unteers into cadres. “Without the rallying causes of the jihad, the Afghan mujahideen 
would not have had neither the numbers, the training, the organization, nor the co-
herence or sense of missions that has since turned jihadist Islam into a global political 
force” (Mamdani M., 2005:6).
The second group of Political Islamists originated in Egypt in 1928; it was led 
by the Egyptian activist and school teacher Hasan al-Banna. The Sunni Muslim Brother-
hood is one of the oldest and the largest, as well as the most influential Islamist organ-
izations. The Muslim Brotherhood has its center in Egypt, though the group maintains 
branches throughout the Arab-Muslim world incl. Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Pal-
estine (Hams), Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Sudan. The aim of this organization is based on 
the al-Banna's proclamation that Islam be “given hegemony over all matters of life.” The 
political program of the Muslim Brotherhood is to establish an Islamic Caliphate span-
ning the entire Muslim world. Its aspiration is to make Islamic (Shari'a) law the sole basis 
of jurisprudence and governance. The credo of the organization is “God is our objective, 
the Koran is our Constitution, the Prophet is our leader, struggle is our way, and death 
for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations”. 
The Muslim Brotherhood became strong in the forties of the last century 
and started challenging the authority of the monarchy. In 1948, the government of the 
Prime Minister Mahmoud Fahmi Nuqrashi dissolved the organization. The organiza-
tion retaliated violently to the government decision and a Muslim Brotherhood mem-
ber assassinated Nuqrashi. The government took similar action against the leader of the 
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organization by killing Hasan al-Banna in 1949 and an official crackdown was launched 
against the brotherhood. 
When the military forces led by Gamal Abdel Nasser took over the politi-
cal power by overthrowing the monarchy in 1952, the Muslim Brotherhood split into 
two factions – into gradualists and those who advocated armed revolution against the 
corrupted Middle Eastern regimes. The gradualists were led by Hasan al-Hudaybi, who 
preferred cooperation with the government to gradually move the country toward Is-
lam. The radical faction was led by the writer and ideologue Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) 
who advocated armed revolution against the corrupted Arab regimes and more broadly 
against the unbelievers in the Western world. Qutb divided the world into“the party of 
Allah and the party of Satan”. The view of Qutb clashed with the military government 
of Egypt; as the result he was executed in 1966 on the charges of plotting to overthrow 
the Egyptian government. Qutb's ideas became inspiration for many radical Muslim or-
ganizations of the Muslim world.
History of Islam in the Horn of Africa is not new for the peoples of this region. 
When Prophet Mohammad started preaching the new religion, his disciples were perse-
cuted by Qureysh tribe whose members were believers of tradition belief; they planned 
to kill the prophet but were afraid of blood-feud of his clan to which his family belonged. 
The people who converted to the new religion were humble folk unable to defend them-
selves against oppression. “So cruel was the persecution they endured that the prophet 
advised who could possibly contrive to do so to immigrate to a Christian country Abys-
sinia.” (Glorious Koran, 1953:XII).
The first group was sent secretly across the Red Sea in 615 C.E. and a large 
group followed it the next year. All in all, over 100 people left, representing a sizable pro-
portion of the Muslims at the time, only two to three years after the Prophet began his 
public preaching. The embryonic Muslim community who was sent to Abyssinia included 
some important figures: Mummad's daughter Ruqayya, her husband Uthman (who would 
become the third Caliph), Muhammad's future wife Umm Habiba, and his cousin Jafar, 
the brother of Ali. The departures angered the Prophet's opponents who wanted to de-
stroy the new religion; they sent their own delegation to the King of Abyssinia to give 
them the emigrants over. The King refused their demand and rendered these Prophet's 
closest people a shelter. The emigration of this Muslim community and the asylum of-
fered to them by the Abyssinian King were often referred to in Hadith (the traditions as-
sociated with the prophet) as “the first and second hijiras to Abyssinia” (Robinson D., 
2004:111). This migration took place six years before Mohammad moved to Medina in 
622. After his arrival to Medina he requested the Abyssinian King to permit the return 
of the exiles, and the king compiled quickly. The emigrants arrived to Medina in 628, 
with many gifts which the king gave them. One of those who came to Medina was Umm 
Habiba whose husband had converted to Christianity and stayed in Aksum. Umm Ha-
biba had divorced from her husband and married the Prophet. According to another 
Hadith, the Prophet gave Abyssinia a special and inviolable state of neutrality, the Dar 
al-Hiyyad. This tradition existed separately from Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, the ba-
sic dichotomy of the Islamic world, and put Abyssinia “off limits” of jihad. This tradition 
is also formulated in a saying attributed to Muhammad: “Leave the Abyssinians alone” 
(Robinson D., 2004:111–12).
This special status was given to Abyssinians because of the assistance they 
provided to the faithful at critical juncture of Islamic history. The Muslim respect for Ab-
yssinia was kept until the 13th century when the small eastern Muslim states met in con-
flict with the expanding Abyssinian Kings.
Expansion	of	Abyssinia	to	the	East	and	conflict	with	the	neighbouring	Muslim	states	
Before the ere of Islam there were Arab traders on the western side of the Red Sea; 
according to the Somali legends, their nation originated in the connection of Oromo 
women and Arab men (Braukamper U., 2002:14). The expansion of Islam to the North 
East Africa started before the ninth century. Starting from the ninth century there 
were many states between the Red Sea and Abyssinia which accepted Islam as their 
own religion and fought against the Abyssinian expansion. One of the dominant states 
between Red Sea and Abyssinia from 1285 to 1415 was the state of Yifat which was 
conquered by the Ethiopian troops of Emperor Yeshak in 1415. The occupation of the 
capital of Yifat Zayila (Zeyila) by Ethiopian troops thus ended Yifat as political entity 
(Braukamper U., 2002:26).
During the rule of Emperor Amda Siyon I (r. 1314–1344) (Marcus H.G., 1994:19) 
the first important southward expansion of Christian settlement took place; Shawa (not 
to be confused with the contemporary province of Shawa in the central Ethiopia) was 
among the Muslim territories ravaged by the Ethiopians.
Emperor Yishaq's victorious campaign to the coast of the Indian Ocean, which 
resulted in the conquest of Zayla, did not permanently interrupt the rise of Islamic king-
doms in the lowland of the Horn of Africa. The period between the thirteenth to half of 
the sixteenth century had been characterized by continuous wars between the lowland 
Muslim states and the highland Abyssinian Christian Kingdom. The policy of these two ex-
pansive groups culminated during the reign of Lebna Dengel (1508–1540) (Marcus H.G., 
1994:29) when the Abyssinian troops invaded Adal and destroyed the castle of the sul-
tan at a place called Zankar in which the Muslim commander was killed. During the hu-
miliating defeat of Muslims a new leader arose in Adal: ibn Ibrahim al Ghazi (1506–1543) 
called Gragn (the left-handed), whose aim was to reconstitute Adalite political power in 
the lowland of the Horn of Africa and to embark on a conquest which brought three-quar-
ters of the Christian empire under his control, “from Ahmad's spectacular victory over the 
Christians at Šembora Kure in 1529 until his final defeat and death at Wayna Daga near 
lake Tana 21 February 1543” (Henze P.B., 2001:88–89). Historically it was an international 
war: both fighting groups were supported by their foreign friends from other continents. 
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What concerns Abyssinia, the military support arrived when the majority of its territory 
was already conquered by Gragn: in February, 1541, 400 Portuguese well-armed Musket-
eers under the command of Christovărio da Gama, son of Vasco da Gama, landed in Mas-
sawa. They brought great quantities of arms including canons, gunpowder, and other sup-
plies and were accompanied by nearly 150 craftsmen, gunsmiths and slaves (Henze P.B., 
2001:88). The Adal leader Gragn appealed to his Muslim co-religionists, Ottoman Turks, 
and “received 900 well-armed reinforcements from Yabid”. However, Gragn, the great 
warrior, made a mistake when he thought that the war is over by sending the Turkish sol-
diers home after he won victory in the late August of 1542: hundreds of Christian soldiers 
were killed, including almost two hundreds of Portuguese; their commander Christovărio 
da Gama was captured and beheaded. In the battle, 168 from 400 Portuguese soldiers 
were killed and 12 were taken as war prisoners. The remaining 120 who survived the on-
slaught reorganized themselves within the army of emperor Galadwos and on 26th Feb-
ruary, 1543 finished the struggle by killing Ahmad Gragn. 
The death of Gragn and his armies disintegration brought an end to the Mus-
lim threat for Abyssinia, but the expansion of this empire continued until the beginning of 
the 20th century when the territory of the empire became three time larger than before 
and Abyssinian population made less than 30% of the people in the empire.
The recorded history informs us about the conflict between Abyssinia and 
Somalis during the rule of the Abyssinian King Yeshak who reigned from 1414 to 1429. 
The record is the victory song of the King over his enemies, and Somalis are one of the 
peoples whom the king fought (Lewis H., 1966:30).
One Somali author asserts that the struggle against the expansion of Ab-
yssinia resulted in the development of the Somali national consciousness: “In the past, 
these struggles took the form of jihads against the Christian rulers of the Abyssinian 
Highlands who were periodically sending raiding parties to the coastal Islamic states 
of the Horn. These struggles were particularly intensive during the sixteenth century.” 
(Hussein A.A., 1983:32)
The modern conflict between the expansionist Ethiopia and Somali people 
started at the end of the 19th century when the Somali territory was occupied and divided 
into five colonial territories among Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, and Italy. In 1897, the 
colonialists signed treaty on the division of Somali territories (Lewis I.M., 2002:56–62). 
Somali territories which were colonized by three western European countries gained their 
independence in 1960 (Somalia) and in 1977 (Djibouti) but the territory colonized by Ethi-
opia has hitherto remained under colonial rule (Bulcha M.,1988:34). Anti-colonial move-
ment started in 1899 as a movement of an organized group led by the name of Islam be-
cause all the colonialists were Christian states. The organized movement of resistance was 
led by Muhammad Abdille Hassan (7. 4. 1864–1920) considered by the Somalis as the first 
nationalist hero of Somali nation; he was organizing his people not on the clan basis but in 
the name of Islam which unifies all the Somalis under one umbrella of religion (Cassanelli 
L.V., 1982:249). This movement waged war against Ethiopia, British and Italian occupants 
for 21 years to eradicate the enemies from the Somali territory.
Contemporary	Political	Islam	in	Somalia
Islam is the official state religion of Somalia, and almost 100 percent of the Somali popu-
lation are Sunni Muslims (cited by Rabasa A., 2009:29). In the pre-colonial Somalia, there 
existed two sources of law: the Somali customary law (xeer) and the Islam law (shari'a). 
If the two contradicted each other, customary law often prevailed. During the colonial 
period, British, French or Italian law were introduced according to the colonial territo-
ries in which these three types of law were coexisting. The independence brought two 
territories together with different legal systems. The Italian colony was ruled by mix of 
Italian legal system, Somali custom law and Islamic shari'a. The British Somaliland was 
ruled by British legal system and both of the Somali legal systems.
On the 1st July, 1960 the British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland were uni-
fied to form the Somali Republic. The first obstacle which the union faced was how to 
integrate two different systems of law, finance, administration and education inherited 
from Italy and Britain (Castagno A.A., 1966:546). Another problem which the demo-
cratic government of Somalia (1960–1969) was unable to solve was which script it was 
to accept: the Arabic, Osmaniya script (invented by Osman Yusuf Kenadid in 1920), or 
a modified version of the Latin script. The military government led by General Sayyid 
Barre (1969–1991) solved the question in 1972 by selecting the modified Latin script as 
the official Somali script; this step contributed a lot to the development of the Somali 
language and to the emancipation of the people from illiteracy.
The	formation	of	al-Itihaad	al-Islaami
On the first anniversary of the military coup (October, 1970), the secular military gov-
ernment proclaimed Scientific Socialism to be the sole ideology of the state. The sec-
ular steps taken by the government clashed with the view of the conservative Islamic 
clerics. The main conflict has emerged when the new liberal law gave women the same 
inheritance rights as men (Marchal R., 2003:118). The government accused many reli-
gious leaders preaching in the mosques against this liberal new law. Ten religious sheikhs 
were publicly executed in January, 1975, and twenty-three others received long prison 
sentences (Lewis I.M., 2002:213). The execution of these religious leaders has become 
a milestone for the formation of the underground resistance organizations operating in 
the name of Islam.
One of them was al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya which considered itself a Salafi (Wah-
habist) society concentrated on “purification of the Faith”; there was nothing political 
about it, it was pure Da'wa (Da'wa is the religious mission of preaching and proselyt-
izing). During the early 1980s, this Salafi movement entered into relations with Wah-
dat al-Shabaab al Islaamiyya, a northern Somali Islamist group. Many of the leaders of 
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both these organizations became key figures in the formation of a new organization. The 
merger of the two organizations took place at some point between 1982 and 1984 and 
brought with it the new name: al-Itihaad al-Islaami (ICG, 100:3–4). The organization at-
tracted many intellectuals (Záhořík J., 2008:80), mainly from the Somali National Uni-
versity, and asserted that Islam could not be separated from the politics. This was a bold 
challenge in the time when the Sayyid Barre's regime was weakening. The political aim 
of the organization was a typical Muslim Brothers' program as one of its former mem-
bers put it: “Al-Itihaad offered an alternative to democracy, communism and man-made 
constitution. Koran and Sunna would be the basis for application of political, social and 
other aspects of life.” (ICG, 100:4) 
As quoted above, al-Itihaad al-Islaami has got a public political agenda and 
its leadership is known to include prominent commercial, political, and military figures 
throughout Somalia; the membership tends to be discreet, even clandestine, making it 
difficult to assess the organization's size and composition. The known members of its 
leadership are Sheikh Ga'ame in Puntland, Sheikh Ali Warsame in Somaliland, former 
army colonel Hassan Dahir Awey – chairman of the Islamic courts in Mogadishu; and 
Hassan Turki – a former military commander in Lower Juba (ICG, 45:16). Al-Itihaad prop-
agates a puritanical, traditionalist (Salafi) version of the Islamic faith, a brand of Wah-
habism. Since this is the theology of Saudi Arabia, most Somali view it as ideological im-
port rather than indigenous affair. The Sufi Order is the dominant sect in Somalia and its 
leaders denounced al-Ithaad adherents as Saruuriyyin – disciples of Sheikh Mohamed 
Zain al-abidin Saruur, a Saudi religious dissident expelled from Saudi Arabia for his radical 
teachings. The first attempt of al-Itihaad al-Islaami to build its political power base took 
place in the southern town of Kismaayo but it was expelled from there by the United So-
mali Congress (USC) led by General Mohammed Farah Aidid in April 1991. The remain-
ing fighters of al-Itihaad moved to the northern port of Bosaaso of Puntland to regroup 
in the area. The crushing military defeat in Kismaayo changed the attitude of the organ-
ization in that the success of the organization's religious mission be assured by taking 
arm; which means that from that time on the plan is not to preach the word of God, but 
to wage Jihad, i.e. “to take power by violence” (Marchal R., 2004:125)
Power	struggle	in	Bosaaso
Bosaaso and its surroundings in the northeast Somalia are inhabited by Majeertin sub-
clan of the Darood. One of the first organized armed movements during the struggle 
against General Sayyid Barre's government was the Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
(SSDF) whose members were stemming principally from the Majeerten sub-clan; they 
fought to liberate the northeast region later called Puntland. The foundation of this 
front rooted in the failed military coup against Sayyyid Barre's government which took 
place in 1978. Some military leaders who were involved in the coup escaped to Ethiopia 
and organized the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) led by the authoritarian 
Colonel Yussuf Abdullahi (Prunier G., 1995:4). When the end of Sayyid Barre's govern-
ment came on 27 January, 1991, he fled in a tank taking with him the gold and foreign 
currency reserves of the Central Bank, worth an estimated US $27 million (Prunier G., 
1995:6). The end of the dictatorial government of General Mohammad Sayyid Barre 
brought along the fragmentation of Somalia. The former British Somaliland declared 
its independence as Somaliland Republic on 18 May, 1991 (I.C.G., No. 66:6). The north-
eastern region declared its autonomy as Puntland. The Puntland administration was 
led by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF); al-Itihaad regrouped in the 
Bosaaso town after a devastating military setback in Kismaayo. With the tacit bless-
ing of the SSDF chairman, General Mohamed Abshir Musa, al-Itihaad took control of 
strategic facilities across the Puntland, including Bosaaso port and hospital. In the vi-
cinity of the town they also established a military base modelled on training facilities 
in Afghanistan. 
In June 1991, al-Itihaad convened its first major conference since the collapse 
of the Sayyid Barre regime, under the chairmanship of Sheikh Ali Warsame. The confer-
ence restructured the movement into five divisions: the chairman of the movement and 
head of the political wing was Ali Warsame; his deputy, Colonel Hassan Dahir Aweys, 
was named the head of military wing; Sheikh Abdulqadir Ga'amy was assigned respon-
sibility for the da'wa (ICG, 100:5). The financial sources of the movement were Bosaaso 
port taxes and contributions from international Islamic organizations such as the large 
Saudi charity, the Muslim World League (Rabitat al-Islam al-ălamiyya), and its subsidi-
ary the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). The existence of al-Itihaad ap-
proached its end when its members carried out two terrorist attacks in Bosaaso. In mid 
June 1992, al-Ithaad was expelled from the region by the SSDF and with military sup-
port from Ethiopia. The al-Itihaad members scattered to Ogaden in Ethiopia, to Somali-
land (Rabasa A., 2009:54) and to Gedo region. Starting from August 1992, the al-Itihaad 
reorganized itself in Luuq – the capital of Gedo region, and controlled the administra-
tion of Gedo region for several years. It used Luuq as base to campaign against the Ethi-
opian targets inside the country. Al-Itihaad was an officially registered political party in 
Ethiopia, but it turned to attack civilian targets such as in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa 
where bomb blasts killed many civilians. When there is no rule of law, the authoritarian 
governments can kill anybody without any proof; a very good example can be the kill-
ing of three unarmed Oromo civilians in Addis Ababa accused of these bomb attacks in 
Diredawa and Addis Ababa, meanwhile al-Itihaad took the responsibility for the bomb-
ing from Somalia (Hassen M., 2009:48). Finally, in January 1997, Ethiopia sent its army 
into Somalia and “many of Islamists – including foreigners – were killed or injured, the 
training camps were dismantled and al-Itihaad's short-lived terror campaign in Ethiopia 
came to an end. Officially, at least al-Itihaad al Islaami both in Ethiopia and Somalia has 
ceased to exist.” (ICG, 100:9)
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The	rise	of	the	Islamic	Courts	Union
The first Islamic court was set up in northern Mogadishu, in the area of the Abgaal sub-
clan of Hawiye, the Medina district of Mogadishu, by former members of the al-Itihaad 
splinter group, al-Ansar as-Sunna, in 1993; it was led by Sheikh Ali Dheere. Other courts 
were formed in western Mogadishu and other parts of the city in 1996 and in 1998. The 
former military colonel of Barre regime and al-Itihaad military wing leader Hassan Da-
hir Aweys established an Islamic Court known as Ifka Halane in Western Mogadishu, and 
another one in Marka, the principal town in lower Shebelle region.  
The contribution of the Islamic Courts during the collapse of the state struc-
ture was that it brought Mogadishu from anarchy to relative order. The Shari'a courts 
played three roles: first, they organized a militia to apprehend criminals; second, they 
passed legal decisions in both civil and criminal cases; and third, they were responsible 
for the incarceration of convicted prisoners (Le Sage A., 2005:38).
The representatives of different Islamic courts formed the Assembly of the 
Courts. The Assembly of 63 members elected its chairman Ali Dheer, and Hassan Dahir 
Aweys was appointed secretary general. The council's primary functions included pris-
oner exchanges and occasional joint military operations, and provided security in most 
of the southern Somalia.
In 2004, a new umbrella organization was established for Mogadishu shari'a 
courts, which is called the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts of Somalia. The chairmen of 
ten courts either participated or named a representative. The Council members elected 
as its chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed educated in Mogadishu, Libya, and Sudan 
and associated with Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a – a traditional Sufi association (Rabasa A., 
2009:59) who is now the President of Somalia.
The Council of Islamic Courts faced unexpected group in 2006. This group was 
called the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). It was com-
posed of Somali warlords who were devastating the country from 1990 until that time, 
and “getting, according to our interviews with some members, about $150,000 a month 
from Washington” (Prendergast J., & Fensen T. C., 2007:68). The interference of the for-
eign power in the Somali conflict built opposition block from the clan leaders to support 
the Islamic Court. From February to June, 2006 there was war between ARPCT and the 
Council of Islamic Courts; finally, ARPCT was defeated. The victorious Council of Islamic 
Courts gets support from the business community and from major public for enforcing 
public order. From June to December, 2006 the Union of Islamic Courts is able to control 
Southern Somalia. December 2006 will be remembered in the Somali history as a month 
of humiliation when historical neighbouring expansionist country occupied their country. 
All the time, Ethiopia wants either weak Somalia, or divided Somalia. In 1990s, Ethiopia 
supported one group against the others in the old colonial system “divide and weaken 
[Ethiopia desires neither a unified nor a stable Somalia (ICG. 45, 2002:9)]. When Somali 
clan leaders, intellectuals, and women supported by UN, AU, EU, Arab League, EGAD 
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and US formed a Transitional National Government (T.N.G.) at Arta conference in Dji-
bouti in January – August, 2000 (Lewis I.M., 2002:291–96) which would lead the country 
for three years, Ethiopian government organized a conference of warlords to oppose the 
Transitional National Government. These warlords held a conference in Awassa town in 
Southern Ethiopia and formed the so called Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Coun-
cil led by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf. International Crisis Group wrote at the beginning of 
2002: “Ethiopia has been funneling arms and money to the latter [SRRC], raising the pos-
sibility of renewed fighting on a much larger scale than the region has seen in a decade” 
(I.C.G.45, 2002:7). This group gradually paralyzed the Transitional National Government 
and became an alternative to the government. 
The Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) organized a peace 
conference starting from 2002 for two years in Kenya and facilitated by external medi-
ators (Kenyan government officials, with close support from IGAD, the UN, and the Eu-
ropean Commission). The election of the president showed the Ethiopian government's 
target to bring Abdullahi Yusuf to power. Prof. Ken Menkhaus, who is expert on contem-
porary Somalia, was at the conference as researcher and observed that “the votes of par-
liamentarians had been purchased with Ethiopian government money. The going rate for 
an MP's vote was said to range from $3,000 to $5,000” (Menkhaus K., 2007:361). Abdul-
lahi Yusuf is from the Majeerten sub-clan of Daarod from Northeastern Somalia (Punt-
land). The region of Mogadishu area is inhabited by Hawiye clan, which had very negative 
experience of Mohammed Sayyid Barre dictatorial administration whom they consider 
as Daarod dictator. When the information of Abdullahi Yusuf election reached Mogad-
ishu, many thousands of people demonstrated against his ‘election’. The negative atti-
tude of Mogadishu people forced the new government to settle in Baidoa – a small town 
near the Ethiopian border. President Yusuf applied for UN and AU to send him 20,000 
soldiers to force the people to accept him. Finally his king-making patron Meles Zenawi 
of Ethiopia sent 40,000 soldiers in December 2006 to Mogadishu to fight the Islamic 
Courts Union. The militia of Islamic Courts Union was not able to face such a huge army, 
and consequently changed their tactic to the guerrilla war. After the Islamic Court Un-
ion militias “went to the forest”, Abdullahi Yusuf – as a puppet of Ethiopia – flew by Ethi-
opian helicopter to Mogadishu. The US government also miscalculated when support-
ing the Ethiopian government policy toward Somalia: led by information given to them 
from Ethiopia, they provided air support bombarding three times many areas in South-
ern Somalia and killing many civilians.
Human Rright Watch reported the situation in its research result published 
on December 8, 2008 with a title “So Much to Fear”. Let us quote from the report: “The 
young man and his family were members of a minority clan that traces its ancestry partly 
back to immigrants from Portugal and so were unusually light skinned. The Ethiopian 
soldiers began joking the young man's two sisters and mother looked more like Eritre-
ans than Somali. With family's father lying dead on the floor in front of them several 
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Ethiopian soldiers took turn raping the three women.‘ And I was sitting there helpless,’ 
the young man said. ‘They started raping my sisters and they were screaming. They were 
there almost three hours. I saw them raping my mother in front of me… I could not help 
my mother or help my sisters’. At his mother's insistence he left Mogadishu the next 
day” (HMW, 8.12.2008:33). During the Ethiopian occupation 16,000 people were killed 
in Somalia. The Ethiopian army also lost many of its soldiers and was forced to withdraw.
The	new	government	of	Somalia	led	by	President	Sheikh	Sharif	Sheikh	Ahmed	
From the very beginning, the government led by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf was the stooge 
of Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and the collaboration of Meles and Abdullahi brought one 
of the worst human catastrophes to Somalia (Samatar A.I., 2007:4). 
Let me bring a Somali proverb what Meles forgot to remember though he 
lived for many years in Somalia when he was a Tigrai guerrilla leader of Tigrai People Lib-
eration Front (TPLF) and traveled with Somali passport. One proverb says: “If you love 
a person, love him moderately, for you do not know whether you will hate him one day; 
on the other hand, if you hate someone, hate him moderately, too; for you do not know 
whether you will love him one day”. Even more succinct is the Somali proverb illustrating 
how the Somali people unite when the external enemy comes to them: 
I and my clan against world. 
I and my brother against the clan.
I against my brother. (Cassanelli L.V., 1982:21)
The Ethiopian army occupation of Somalia unified the Somalis against this 
external enemy as Brian Smith correctly expressed in his article: “succeeded in uniting 
Somalia's various Islamic and clan-based militias against it” (Brian S., 25.3.2009). The 
unified Somali fighters forced Abdullahi Yusuf to resign from the post of presidency and 
open the way for the formation of new parliament which was comprised of Djibouti based 
Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) and the existing parliament. In February 
of this year, the new parliament elected new president – the chairman of the Union of 
Islamic Courts (UIC), Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Sheik Sharif is from Hawiye clan of 
Mogadishu area and he named as Prime Minister the son of the former president of So-
malia from Daarod clan who was assassinated in 1969.
After the departure of Ethiopian army from Somalia the united forces against 
the external enemy started to fragment.
One of the new regrouped organizations is called Hizbul Islam (Party of Is-
lam) and it is led by Omar Imam Abubaker, who was deputy chairman to Aweys in the 
UIC parliament in 2006.
The President declared that he is ready to speak to all the Somali groups in-
cluding Al Shaaba to be included into the government; it is maybe a new era for the So-
malis to build their new state depending on their political culture of building from the 
grassroot up to the federal state. 
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Abstract: 
The paper by Roman Míčka called «G. K. Chesterton as a Defensor Fidei» tries to place 
Chesterton's work into the context of theological and apologetical thought and especially 
into the context of Christian spirituality in its first part. It tries to describe and reflect speci-
fics of Chesterton's religious attitudes and experience of faith. Besides the accent on practi-
cal sense and virtuous life his spirituality is distinguished by great friendship to the world, 
toleration to controversial historic dramas of Christianity and acknowledgement of the va-
lue of sensual world. It is a spirituality of joy and sensuality, friendly attitude to enjoyment. 
By this Chesterton represents an «antimystical» and an «antiascetical» tradition in the con-
text of Catholic Christianity.
The second part of the paper is focused on Chesterton's book The Catholic Church 
and Conversion [1926] which is less known in the Czech background. The book is placed into 
the context of other Chesterton's apologetical works and the paper acceses and reflects fun-
damental ideas of the book, especially those refering to the character of Catholicism. There 
are accesed and reflected Chesterton's opinions concerning the position of Catholicism in the 
context of other Christian denominations and its future perspectives, Chesterton's concepti-
on of Catholic tradition and relation to religious truth, the question of Catholic accenting par-
ticular truths in specific historic contexts, when Chesterton presents Catholicism as an es-
sence of reason and liberty. The end of the paper evaluates the historical meaning of G. K. 
Chesterton in the area of theological thought.
Roman Míčka
G. K. Chesterton  
jako „Defensor Fidei”
„Církev však není hnutí, ale místo setkávání, zkušební místo  
pro všechny pravdy světa.”
 [CHESTERTON, Gilbert Keith, 1926].
„Církev je dům se stem bran a žádní dva lidé nevstupují dovnitř zcela stejně.”
„Stát se katolíkem neznamená zanechat myšlení, ale naučit se jak myslet.”
„Esencí a zdravým jádrem této civilizace je filosofie katolické církve.”
 [CHESTERTON, Gilbert Keith, 2006, s. 38, 106, 102].
